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“YOU’VE GOT [OPEN] [E]MAIL”—THE UNKNOWN EMAIL 
PRIVACY ISSUE AND THE NEED FOR THE STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT TO REFLECT THE MODERN UTILITY 
OF THE INBOX  
James Palanica† * 
Abstract 
This Note identifies the divided jurisprudence surrounding the 
protection of opened emails from unauthorized access under the Stored 
Communications Act and advocates for the interpretation espoused by 
the Fourth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Hately v. Watts. The traditional 
view of the Stored Communications Act, as employed by the Department 
of Justice, neither sufficiently protects opened emails nor reflects the 
modern usage of email inboxes. While the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have 
previously attempted to expand protection to opened emails by 
prioritizing user intent, such a standard has proved difficult to manage 
and has resulted in disparate outcomes depending on whether one uses a 
desktop-based or web-based email provider. The Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Hately protects opened emails regardless of email platform, 
but it accomplishes this task by stretching legislative intent to its limit. 
As a result, the unauthorized access provisions of the Stored 
Communications Act have been fractured into at least three different 
interpretations and require a resolution by the Supreme Court or revision 
by Congress to uniformly protect emails nationwide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are an estimated 254.7 million email users in the United States 
alone,1 and 95% of them say they check their email either “as often as 
they should” or “way too often.”2 Despite the frequency with which a vast 
majority of Americans check their email, it seems unlikely that many 
email users are aware that the privacy of their emails might depend on 
whether they have opened their emails or the type of email provider they 
use. 
From the memorable “Try America Online (AOL)” disks and the 
emergence of free providers such as Hotmail3 to the much more recent 
rise of the smartphone and wireless high-speed internet, both the ease and 
speed of electronic communication have improved. But concerns 
surrounding privacy have also increased, especially as to the 
government’s ability to acquire emails or other electronic data in the 
course of an investigation.4 The recent decisions in Carpenter v. United 
States5 and United States v. Dorsey6 were quite noteworthy in that they 
berated and declared unconstitutional portions of the Stored 
Communications Act7 (SCA), which had previously allowed the 
 
 1. eMarketer & Squarespace, Number of E-mail Users in the United States from 2013 to 
2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/253790/number-of-e-mail-users-in-the-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/SGJ2-4L9K]. 
 2. J. Clement, Frequency of Checking E-mail in General According to Workers in the 
United States as of June 2018, STATISTA (July 3, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
911623/frequency-workers-checking-emails-in-general/ [https://perma.cc/ZWG2-AA2E]. 
  3. Kate Hoy, Opinion, This Month in Tech History: Hotmail Launched, IDG CONNECT 
(July 1, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.idgconnect.com/article/3581120/this-month-in-tech-
history-hotmail-launched.html [https://perma.cc/5J5T-W6LV] (stating that Hotmail was 
“[p]roclaimed the world’s first web-based email when it launched on 4th July 1996. The 
Independence Day launch aimed to symbolise the ‘freedom’ Hotmail offered—from ISP-based 
email as well as the ability to access your inbox from anywhere in the world”). 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 5. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 6. 781 F. App’x 590 (2019). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1860, 1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701–2711). 
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government to obtain electronic data without a warrant or probable 
cause.8  
However, despite the importance of Carpenter and Dorsey in the 
United States’ battle with modern technology, this Note is not another 
epic of the U.S. Supreme Court heroically lowering the Fourth 
Amendment’s shield to protect individuals from government overreach. 
Rather, this Note presents the other side of the coin. It is a story of 
everyday wrongdoing by private parties against one another. Specifically, 
this Note identifies the splintered authority surrounding a commonplace 
issue that likely does not cross the mind of either the tech-savvy 
millennial or the baby boomer user of Outlook Express: the privacy of 
opened emails under the Stored Communications Act and the right to a 
civil cause of action for the violation of that privacy in addition to 
criminal penalties.9 While courts have recognized that emails intercepted 
in transit or sitting unopened in one’s inbox are protected under the 
SCA,10 the judicial landscape surrounding the status of opened emails 
continues to be inconsistent, allowing, for example, the exposure of a 
mistress’s emails to go unpunished in one jurisdiction11 and reprimanding 
the search for alleged proof of infidelity in another.12 
I.  THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
Prior to examining the differing interpretations regarding one’s 
privacy in open emails, it is important to understand the general reasoning 
behind Congress’s enactment of the SCA.13 Why would one’s personal 
emails (or other electronic messages) not be inherently protected from 
 
 8. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (concluding “that the Government must generally 
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records” (emphasis added)); 
Dorsey, 781 F. App’x at 591. In Dorsey, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the unconstitutionality 
of portions of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), specifically § 2703(d). Dorsey, 781 F. 
App’x at 591. The government had obtained cell tower data under a court order, which does not 
require a warrant or probable cause. Id. “Under the SCA, the government needed to demonstrate 
only a reasonable belief that the data was relevant and material to an ongoing investigation. Id. In 
light of the recent decision in Carpenter, the court held that a warrant supported by probable cause 
was required to obtain this data. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (providing criminal penalties for unauthorized access to stored 
communications); id. § 2707 (providing for a civil cause of action). 
 10. Vista Marketing, LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954, 963–64 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 11. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 243, 245 (S.C. 2012). 
 12. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 773–74 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 13. The “Stored Communications Act” is the common vernacular to reference U.S.C. 
§§ 2701–2711. These sections were initially passed under Title II of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, but nowhere does the phrase “Stored Communications Act” appear 
in the language of the statute. COMPUT. CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 115, n.1 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE]. 
3
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unauthorized access? Why are electronic communications from one 
person to another not inherently private?  
The average American’s innate sense of “privacy” likely stems from 
the Fourth Amendment’s language regarding search and seizure.14 
However, while the Fourth Amendment sets forth foundational individual 
liberties15 and shields individuals from arbitrary surveillance,16 Katz v. 
United States17 recognized that the Fourth Amendment “cannot be 
translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”18 Rather, the 
Fourth Amendment protects against “certain kinds of government 
intrusion”19 and seeks to avoid the development of a police state.20 Katz 
further refined the Fourth Amendment as “protect[ing] people, not 
places”21 and provided the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.22 
Also, Fourth Amendment protections only exist between the government 
and citizens, not between private parties.23 As a result, the evolution of 
“privacy” in the United States appears to be bifurcated into (1) the judicial 
application of the Fourth Amendment and (2) any statutorily 
supplemented privacy rights. 
Acknowledging that technology and the ability for arbitrary oversight 
have both changed since the Founding,24 Professor Orin Kerr25 provides 
an excellent overview of why the Fourth Amendment alone does not 
provide adequate protection for electronic mail. First, it is unclear 
 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 15. See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018) (“Few protections are as 
essential to individual liberty as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 16. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[T]he Amendment seeks 
to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). 
 17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 18. Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14. 
 21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 22. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the test as “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 23. See id. at 350–51 (majority opinion) (“[A] person’s general right to privacy—his right 
to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left 
largely to the law of the individual States.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
 24. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986) (noting that technological advancements over the 
past centuries have expanded the possibility of arbitrary government oversight beyond physically 
entering houses and seizing personal effects). 
 25. Professor Kerr’s work and recent Volokh blog post, see Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Circuit 
Deepens the Split on Accessing Opened E-Mails, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:05 AM), 
https://reason.com/2019/03/21/fourth-circuit-deepens-the-split-on-civi/ [https://perma.cc/2NUD-
V3MR], shed light on this gap in the Stored Communications Act—and inspired this Note. 
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whether email users have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” due to 
the way that email functions as a technology.26 Generally speaking, an 
email is first sent to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which acts as a 
third party in processing and sending the message onward to the 
designated recipient.27 But in theory, when one discloses information to 
a third party—in this case, an ISP—the individual cannot be considered 
to have a reasonable expectation of privacy and such information loses 
Fourth Amendment protections.28 Second, Professor Kerr emphasizes 
that rules governing grand jury subpoenas leave emails exposed. Because 
grand jury subpoenas—unlike warrants—do not require probable cause, 
emails are much more easily accessible from third-party ISPs.29 Finally, 
ISPs are usually private third parties and not government entities.30 
Because the Fourth Amendment only restrains the government’s 
behavior, a third-party ISP can disclose information to the government or 
other third parties.31 Absent any supplemental form of statutory 
regulation, the Fourth Amendment alone seems to afford limited 
protections to email or electronic communications.32 
Aware of the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, Congress had 
already expressed sensitivity toward technological developments earlier 
in the twentieth century.33 Yet by the mid-1980s, Congress became 
concerned about the applicability of existing federal law34 to new forms 
of electronic communication, such as wireless phones, electronic mail, 
 
 26. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1210 & n.11 (citing several Supreme Court cases in support of this proposition). 
 29. See id. at 1211–12. Because government officials are not often physically raiding an 
ISP’s premises, absent more stringent regulation, officials would request subpoenas over 
warrants. See id. 
 30. Id. at 1212. 
 31. Id. at 1212 & n.22 (citing circuit court cases holding that third-party actors, even when 
acting maliciously, do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as they are not acting at the 
behest of the government). 
 32. See id. at 1212. Professor Kerr notes that the internet appears to be “‘custom designed’ 
to frustrate” Fourth Amendment protections. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986). In 1928, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because no item was physically seized by the government nor did a trespass occur. S. REP. NO. 
99-541, at 2. However, in 1967, the Court reversed its logic in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), holding that the Fourth Amendment did apply to government interception of telephone 
calls, and in the same year released a decision in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), 
providing that Fourth Amendment protected citizens from electronic eavesdropping of oral 
correspondence. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2. 
 34. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (referencing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was enacted in response to the Katz and Berger decisions).  
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and pagers.35 In response, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
concluded, in an extensive report published in 1985, that the “existing 
statutory framework” was not readily applicable to these new 
technologies and, specifically, that protections for electronic mail were 
“weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent.”36 The OTA report further clarified 
that while first-class mail had extensive statutory protections from 
unauthorized access both during delivery and when inside mail 
receptacles,37 electronic mail did not possess any of these safeguards 
during its transit or storage.38 Such a dichotomy presented a significant 
issue because the parties that used first-class mail and electronic mail 
were (and are still today) identical.39 Consequently, Congress sought to 
advance the law with technology in mind to avoid the erosion of Fourth 
Amendment protections and to secure privacy for electronic mail.40 As 
such, the SCA established “a set of Fourth Amendment–like privacy 
protections by statute” to protect electronic mail.41 In accomplishing this 
goal, the SCA not only regulates the government’s ability to force ISPs 
to reveal information but also limits the circumstances in which ISPs can 
voluntarily disclose information to the government.42 To further regulate 
private parties, the SCA provides for both criminal and civil penalties for 
persons who unlawfully access, alter, or obstruct lawful access to stored 
electronic communications.43 Overall, the SCA seeks to strike a fair 
balance between citizens’ privacy expectations and the legitimate needs 
of law enforcement.44  
 
 35. Id. at 2–4. After Senator Patrick Leahy presented the question to the DOJ, the then-
Attorney General concluded in 1984 that reasonable expectations of privacy were “not always 
clear or obvious” in the context of new forms of wireless electronic communication. Id. at 4.  
 36. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3, 45 (1985) [hereinafter OTA ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE]. 
 37. Id. at 45; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1708 (providing protections against 
unauthorized access of physical mail). 
 38. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 48–50. 
 39. Id. at 48 (“Government officials might be interested in accessing or maintaining 
surveillance of electronic mail messages for investigative purposes. Private parties might be 
interested in electronic mail surveillance for various competitive, personal, and/or criminal 
purposes.”). 
 40. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5. 
 41. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1212. 
 42. See id. at 1212–13 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703); see also 
§ 2703(a)–(d) (providing the procedure by which the government can obtain a search warrant, 
administrative subpoena, or § 2703(d) court order (the latter being held unconstitutional per 
Carpenter) to compel disclosure from an ISP); § 2702(a)–(c) (prohibiting the voluntary disclosure 
of email contents or customer records, except in the process of disclosing such information to the 
intended recipients of the emails and certain other enumerated situations, such as in suspected 
child trafficking cases). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2707. 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5. 
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It appears that the SCA was well-intentioned in filling the gaps 
presented by the digital age. One would wager that most are happy with 
the general goal of protecting email in the same manner as first-class 
mail,45 setting rules of engagements for third-party ISPs,46 and 
sanctioning the unauthorized access of emails.47 However, the devil is 
always in the details, or, in this case, in the definitions and conjunctions.48 
This Note focuses on the divisions caused by the SCA’s definitions of 
“electronic storage” and “backup protection.”49 Such divisions highlight 
the courts’ differing views on the SCA’s treatment of “opened emails”—
a focal point over the modern use of traditional or web-based email 
inboxes. Further, while the historical development of the SCA has an 
emphasis on establishing Fourth Amendment-like protections from 
government oversight, recent disputes seem focused on SCA breaches by 
private citizens against each other. 
II.  THE THREE EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS OF “ELECTRONIC STORAGE” 
AND “BACKUP PROTECTION”—ARE ANY OF THEM ACCEPTABLE? 
This Part seeks to clarify the roughly three differing interpretations of 
the definition of “electronic storage” and “backup protection”50 as 
applied to opened emails and, in turn, determine whether opened emails 
are statutorily protected from unauthorized access under the SCA.51 To 
begin, Section II.A discusses the conservative yet splintered opinions in 
Jennings v. Jennings,52 all of which held that opened emails are not 
protected by the SCA.53 Section II.B then analyzes the holdings of 
Theofel v. Farey-Jones54 and Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire 
Protection District,55 which struck a middle ground, prizing the user’s 
intent regarding “backup protection.” Finally, Section II.C discusses the 
recent opinion in Hately v. Watts,56 which attempted to embrace the 
 
 45. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 45. 
 46. See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1212–13. 
 47. See §§ 2701, 2707. 
 48. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2012); id. at 247–48 (Toal, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (debating the significance of the word “and”); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 
359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the rule against surplusage to find certain 
subsections of the SCA disjunctive rather than conjunctive). 
 49. See infra Sections II.A–C; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (defining “electronic 
storage”). 
 50. See § 2510(17). 
 51. See § 2701. 
 52. 736 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 2012). 
 53. Id. at 245; id. at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 249 (Pleicones, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  
 54. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 55. 793 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 56. 917 F.3d 770 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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modern use of email inboxes by extending the SCA’s protection to 
opened emails, regardless of the email technology used.   
A.  The Importance of Conjunctions—The Fractured Opinion of 
Jennings and Three Different Ways of Saying “No” 
The background of Jennings reveals the importance of the legal 
distinction between opened and unopened emails. The case invoked a 
common scenario, the breakdown of an intimate personal relationship.57 
Lee Jennings (Lee) had been having an affair with a woman with whom 
he had corresponded with over email.58 After finding a card from another 
woman in her husband’s car and receiving subsequent verbal 
confirmation from Lee that he had a mistress, Gail Jennings (Gail) 
informed her daughter-in-law, Holly Broome (Broome), of the 
situation.59 Broome knew that Lee had a Yahoo! email account and 
correctly guessed the answers to his security questions.60 Broome found 
opened emails between Lee and his paramour, and Broome gave the 
emails to Gail’s divorce attorneys.61 When Lee realized that Broome had 
accessed these emails, Lee sued Gail, Broome, and a private investigator, 
inter alia, for violating § 2701 of the SCA, asserting that his opened 
emails qualified as being in electronic storage.62 
After reading the facts of Jennings, one might guess that most 
individuals would recognize some form of wrongdoing on Broome’s 
behalf. Does society’s penchant for drama and reality television have one 
screaming at the television to investigate Lee’s alleged mistress? 
Presumably, yes. But taking a step back, Broome clearly violated her 
father-in-law’s privacy by breaking into his Yahoo! account and reading 
his emails, right? Wrong: Broome was not held liable under the SCA.63 
Although the five justices of the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
admonished Broome’s behavior and emphasized possible relief on 
alternative theories, the court issued three different opinions detailing 
distinct rationales; however, all of the justices ultimately agreed with the 
result that Lee’s emails were not protected under the SCA.64 This Section 
explores all three opinions. 
 
 57. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 243. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Lee Jennings also sued for invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and violations of the 
South Carolina Homeland Security Act. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-135 (2020) 
(providing a civil penalty similar to § 2707 of the SCA). Notably, the South Carolina Code uses 
the same definition for “electronic storage” as the SCA. § 17-30-15(18). 
 63. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245. 
 64. Id. at 245 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 248 (Pleicones, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  
8
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First, it is important to identify the contested portion of the SCA. The 
SCA punishes unauthorized access to “electronic communication while 
it is in electronic storage.”65 The SCA defines “electronic storage” as: 
 (A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or 
electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof; and 
 (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication[.]66 
The words “and” as well as “backup protection” are key considerations 
in Justice Kaye Hearn’s analysis and the additional concurring opinions. 
With regard to the above-emphasized “and,” Justice Hearn 
acknowledged that the “traditional interpretation” of the statute espoused 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is that emails must meet both 
subsection (A) and (B) to qualify for protection.67 In this scenario, the 
only emails that would be protected under the statute are those that have 
been received by the intended recipient’s email provider but that have not 
yet been accessed by the recipient.68 Such an interpretation of electronic 
storage seems to focus on the technology of email submission rather than 
the express intent of the user.69 Justice Hearn noted that a majority of 
courts have departed from this interpretation and now accept that an email 
can be in electronic storage if it meets either (A) or (B),70 citing Theofel 
as the key proponent of the reasoning that opened emails left in an inbox 
could be considered “in electronic storage.”71 However, because Lee only 
argued that his emails were in electronic storage pursuant to paragraph 
(B), Justice Hearn did not commit the court to deciding its preferred 
interpretation of the “and” language.72 Additionally, Lee had simply left 
these emails in his Yahoo! email inbox and did not copy or retain them 
elsewhere.73 In reasoning that “passive inaction” in leaving opened 
emails in an inbox did not comport with the plain meaning of “backup,” 
 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (emphasis added).  
 66. Id. § 2510(17) (emphasis added). 
 67. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244; see DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123–
24. 
 68. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123–24; Kerr, supra note 25. 
 69. See Kerr, supra note 25. In order to provide uninterrupted services or prevent loss of 
data, email/internet service providers often make backups of unopened emails on multiple servers. 
See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 50 (mentioning that email providers often 
make copies of emails for administrative purposes). 
 70. § 2510(17); see Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244. 
 71. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th 
Cir. 2004)).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 245. 
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Justice Hearn could not classify the emails as being in electronic storage 
and therefore held Broome not liable under the SCA.74 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal’s concurrence advocated 
that the adoption of the “traditional interpretation of the statute”75 
provides a more equitable application of the law and is most consistent 
with Congress’s legislative intent.76 In criticizing Justice Hearn’s 
rationale, Chief Justice Toal reasoned that the privacy of opened emails 
should not depend on the technology the service provider uses.77 Further, 
her reasoning turned on the unambiguous use of “and” in the statute, 
which, barring other context, should retain its plain meaning.78 As a 
result, Chief Justice Toal reasoned that “electronic storage refers only to 
temporary storage [of emails], made in the course of 
transmission, . . . and to backups of such intermediate 
communications.”79 Thus, the only emails that would be protected under 
the SCA would be those that are unread. While Chief Justice Toal noted 
that this interpretation of the law may be “ill-fitted” to govern problems 
of the modern day, she asserted that this view is most consistent with the 
legislative history80 and, in turn, she resisted legislating from the bench. 
Justice Costa Pleicones provided the third opinion, with yet a different 
rationale. While Justice Pleicones agreed that the SCA applied to 
temporary storage during communications and backups of those 
communications, he argued that they were distinct from one another and 
thus must be equally and separately considered.81 The former applies to 
unopened emails in transit to the final user, and the latter applies to 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 125 (acknowledging both the 
traditional understanding of “electronic storage” and the new precedent in the Ninth Circuit under 
Theofel). 
 76. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 77. Id. at 246–47 (“[I]f one uses Microsoft Outlook for e-mail, one will be protected, but if 
one uses Yahoo! Mail for e-mail, there is no protection.”). Chief Justice Toal emphasized the 
difference between desktop email clients and webmail clients. A desktop email client is a piece 
of software that pulls emails from a server, such as Microsoft Exchange. In comparison, webmail 
products, such as Yahoo!, operate entirely in web browsers. Therefore, one would have to 
download an email from a webmail account to a desktop to save an email copy, but no action 
would be required with a desktop email client.  
 78. Id. at 247. 
 79. See id. at 248. 
 80. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986) (“If the intended addressee subscribes to 
the service, the message is stored by the company’s computer ‘mail box’ until the subscriber calls 
the company to retrieve its mail, which is then routed over the telephone system to the recipient’s 
computer. If the addressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail company can put 
the message onto paper and then deposit it in the normal postal system.” (emphasis added)). One 
can only imagine a millennial’s reaction to this suggestion. 
 81. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 248–49 (Pleicones, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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backup copies the service provider makes.82 Because Lee’s emails were 
not also copies his service provider made for backup, Justice Pleicones 
concurred that the emails were not protected under the SCA.83 
Overall, each of the court’s opinions sheds some light on the evident 
inconsistencies when interpreting the SCA. Beginning with the most 
conservative interpretation, Chief Justice Toal’s argument makes sense 
from a strict textualist perspective. “And” is a coordinating conjunction, 
which would require the satisfaction of both paragraphs (A) and (B); to 
modify this meaning would constitute legislating from the bench.84 In 
keeping with the traditional view of the SCA,85 Chief Justice Toal 
highlighted that the Theofel rationale has produced inconsistent results 
depending on email technology.86 It seems highly unlikely that the 
legislators wanted SCA protections to differ between desktop and web-
based emails services, given that the intent of the SCA was to bring the 
security of electronic correspondence to parity with first-class mail.87 
Although Chief Justice Toal desired to avoid “interpretations of a statute 
which would produce absurd results” in light of legislative history,88 it is 
equally frustrating that the SCA does not adequately protect the modern 
use of email inboxes, which could be accomplished via judicial action or, 
at least, by a suggestion to legislators. 
Justice Pleicones did not add much to the landscape in his short 
concurrence. In viewing paragraphs (A) and (B) as necessarily distinct, 
perhaps because temporary intermediate storage and a service provider’s 
decision to back up an email could occur independently from one another, 
Justice Pleicones’s interpretation did not vary much in substance from 
Chief Justice Toal’s.  
Justice Hearn’s plurality opinion proved to be more open yet 
somewhat arbitrary. Despite his indication that no decision would be 
made in adopting either the traditional DOJ interpretation or the Theofel 
interpretation of the SCA, Justice Hearn, perhaps unintentionally, 
endorsed user intent as a compelling factor relating to “backup 
protection” in the same vein as Theofel. In analyzing “backup protection,” 
 
 82. See id. at 249. This interpretation suggests that Justice Pleicones advocates for an “or” 
as opposed to an “and” interpretation. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See id. at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  
 85. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123. 
 86. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247–48 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771–72 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (highlighting that users of 
web-based email systems, such as Hotmail, are not protected under Theofel by Hotmail’s default 
interface, in contrast to users of desktop email systems, such as Microsoft Outlook, who are 
protected). 
 87. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
 88. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)). 
11
Palanica: "You've Got [Open] [E]mail"—The Unknown Email Privacy Issue and t
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
672 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
Justice Hearn concluded that Lee’s emails could not be considered 
backed up specifically because Lee did not take positive action to move 
the emails from his Yahoo! inbox to another location.89 If Justice Hearn 
did not consider user intent relevant, it would not have mattered even if 
Lee had taken the positive action to move his emails because the 
traditional view of the SCA only considers “backup protection” as 
relevant to the ISP’s needs, not the email user’s. It also seems 
questionable that Justice Hearn’s view of user intent could not also 
include “doing nothing” because Lee’s emails were arguably “backed up” 
and accessible just as easily by leaving them in his Yahoo! inbox as by 
downloading them to his desktop or paying for separate storage. At any 
rate, Justice Hearn showed sympathy to the Theofel interpretation without 
formally endorsing it. 
B.  Expanding the Protection of Opened Emails—The Ninth Circuit’s 
Focus on User Intent and the Eighth Circuit’s Subsequent Temperance 
Consistent with its reputation for having a more expansive 
jurisprudence,90 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit broke 
away from the traditional interpretation of “electronic storage” and 
protections provided to opened emails in Theofel. Ironically, the Theofel 
and Jennings courts justified their conclusions using the same rationale: 
the plain meaning of the statutory language.91 Theofel is arguably the 
seminal case in distinguishing itself from the “traditional” interpretation 
of the SCA,92 supporting perhaps a more modern conception of email in 
effectuating the email user’s intent over the ISP’s intent. Further, while 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the 
importance of user intent emphasized in Theofel, the court in Anzaldua 
placed constraints on the subject without clear-cut rules, narrowing the 
concept but making results less predictable for the public. 
 
 89. Id. at 245. 
 90. Hearing on: Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
115th Cong. 12–13 (2018) (written testimony of Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law, 
Vanderbilt Law School). From 1994 to 2015, the Ninth Circuit was reversed more than 2.5 times 
as often as the least reversed circuits and 44% more often than the next closest circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit. Id. See also Rush Limbaugh, Keeping an Eye on the Ninth Circus, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW 
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2017/02/09/keeping-a-sharp-eye-on-the-
9th-circus/ [https://perma.cc/U8E6-GQXF] (applying the nickname “Ninth Circus” and 
stereotyping the court as uniquely progressive). 
 91. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245 (referencing Merriam-Webster Dictionary); id. at 246 
(Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Webster’s Dictionary). Chief Justice Toal’s 
concurrence stressed the plain meaning of the conjunction “and.” Id. at 247.  
 92. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123. The traditional interpretation, 
as set forth by the Department of Justice, requires that an item satisfy both § 2510(17)(A) and (B) 
in order to qualify as being in “electronic storage.” See id. at 123–24.  
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To continue illustrating the recurring friction of the SCA between 
private parties, a discussion of the facts of Theofel and Anzaldua is useful. 
In Theofel, officers of Integrated Capital Associates (ICA) had pending 
litigation against the defendant, Farey-Jones.93 During discovery, the 
attorney for Farey-Jones issued an overly broad subpoena to ICA’s ISP, 
Netgate, for production of emails.94 Believing the subpoena was a 
legitimate order, Netgate did not challenge the subpoena and decided to 
provide garden variety emails to Farey-Jones without notifying ICA’s 
officers.95 The emails were post-delivery copies that were left on 
Netgate’s servers.96 Most of the emails provided did not relate to the 
ongoing litigation, and many were privileged.97 Needless to say, the 
magistrate judge berated Farey-Jones’s attorney for the egregious 
subpoena, which resulted in fines.98 ICA’s officers filed a separate civil 
suit alleging, inter alia, that Farey-Jones’s actions regarding the subpoena 
violated the SCA, but the district court held that the SCA did not apply 
because Netgate had granted Farey-Jones access to the emails.99 
As a baseline, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the quashed subpoena 
was consistent with the “unauthorized access” element of § 2701 of the 
SCA.100 The court’s comparison of the scenario to the common law tort 
of trespass is illustrative. Just as it would be trespass under common law 
to physically access, under false pretenses, a storage facility holding 
sensitive documents, so would it be a violation of the SCA to access 
electronic storage without permission.101 Such a rationale seems parallel 
with Congress’s intent to bring the protection of electronic 
correspondence to parity with older methods of communication.102 
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale regarding “electronic storage” made 
Theofel the seminal case on the issue, departing from the DOJ’s 
traditional interpretation of the SCA.103 Holding that the “electronic 
storage” element could be satisfied by meeting § 2510(17)(A) or (B),104 
 
 93. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 94. Id. The subpoena should have only been for emails related to the litigation, but was 
rather for “all emails sent or received by anyone,” without regard to date. Id. The magistrate judge 
found the subpoena “patently unlawful.” Id. at 1071–72. 
 95. Id. at 1071. “Garden variety” is this Note’s term—Circuit Judge Kozinski described 
Netgate’s provision of 339 emails as a “free sample” in a “Baskin-Robbins” approach of 
complying with the subpoena. Id. at 1071. 
 96. Id. at 1075. 
 97. Id. at 1071. 
 98. Id. at 1071–72.  
 99. Id. at 1072. 
 100. Id. at 1072, 1074–75. 
 101. Id. at 1072–73 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 78 (W. Page Keeton et 
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).  
 102. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 48, 50. 
 103. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123.  
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 
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Theofel drastically increased the categories of emails (or other electronic 
communications) that are protected under the SCA.105 As Justice Hearn 
recognized in Jennings, Theofel’s broader interpretation has become the 
majority view in a little over half a decade,106 with numerous courts 
following suit.107 By further recognizing that ICA’s emails were 
undisputedly stored “by an electronic communication service,” the 
Theofel court identified that the only issue at hand was whether the emails 
on Netgate’s servers were stored “for purposes of backup protection.”108 
From the Ninth Circuit’s perspective, the emails located on Netgate’s 
servers were indeed stored for purposes of “backup protection” by the 
plain meaning of the statutory language.109 Rather than disapprove of the 
“passive inaction” in leaving opened emails on Netgate’s server, which 
Justice Hearn later did in Jennings,110 the Ninth Circuit held that an 
“obvious purpose” of leaving the emails on the server was to recall them 
again, and that Netgate’s copy functioned as a “backup” for the user.111 
Emphasizing the importance of user intent, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that ICA’s previously opened emails on Netgate’s server were indeed 
protected under the SCA, and thus reversed the district court’s 
decision.112 
By focusing on user intent, the Theofel court’s interpretation of the 
SCA made the statute more “user-friendly,” placing the decision-making 
regarding storage in the hands of the user. Should the users not ultimately 
decide how they go about managing their own emails? In a world of cheap 
(or often free) electronic storage, why should an email user feel 
compelled to take immediate action on emails, such as downloading, 
 
 105. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76 (indicating that the government’s interpretation of the 
SCA makes subsection (B) superfluous because, if the law only applies to unopened emails in 
one’s inbox, then the emails are already protected under subsection (A)). But see Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633–34, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that “back-
up protection” under subsection (B) does not extend protection to post-transmission storage), aff’d 
in part and vacated in part, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit critiqued Fraser’s 
interpretation as also rendering subsection (B) substantially without effect by stipulating that 
“backup protection” only applies to temporary backup storage pending delivery and not to any 
“post-transmission” activities. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76. 
 106. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2012). 
 107. See, e.g., Strategic Wealth Grp., LLC v. Canno, No. 10-0321, 2011 WL 346592, at *3–
4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2011); Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. Prod. Input Sols., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 
2d 1029, 1055 (N.D. Iowa 2011); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at *5 
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 983 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (C.D. Ill. 2009). 
 108. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245. Justice Hearn disagreed with the reasoning in Theofel, 
holding that backup protection required some form of affirmative act rather than simply leaving 
the emails on the server. Id. 
 111. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075. 
 112. See id. at 1077. 
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categorizing, or deleting them? While the Theofel opinion is in some 
ways satisfying because of its emphasis on user intent, its reasoning raises 
other problems. In countering the government’s argument that the SCA 
only required that the original message be temporary rather than the 
backup, the Ninth Circuit introduced the concept of an email’s “lifespan”: 
But the lifespan of a backup is necessarily tied to that of the 
underlying message. Where the underlying message has 
expired in the normal course, any copy is no longer 
performing any backup function. An ISP that kept 
permanent copies of temporary messages could not fairly be 
described as “backing up” those messages.113 
As a result, the Theofel court prized the concept of user intent, but, 
perhaps inadvertently, placed a potentially arbitrary limit on the use of 
inboxes as a permanent repository for open emails. When or how does an 
underlying email “expire in normal course”? Is it a specific number of 
days, or when a certain action occurs? The Theofel court’s reasoning on 
this issue leaves itself open to attack—particularly given the evidence 
regarding the SCA’s legislative history114—and has led to a narrowing 
and speculation of user intent, rather than a general acceptance of the 
concept.115   
Further, the Theofel opinion both produces different results depending 
on email technology and creates certain public policy concerns. To 
clarify, the plaintiffs in Theofel received emails via a traditional desktop 
client, which received the emails on a server before downloading copies 
to the plaintiffs’ hard drives.116 It was a two-step process. In contrast, 
emails delivered to web-based email accounts remain solely in the cloud 
 
 113. Id. at 1076.  
 114. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 246 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that 
the legislative history supported that § 2510(17)(B) of the SCA valued the administrative purposes 
of the service provider, rather than the user’s intent or preferences) (“An understanding of the 
structure of the SCA indicates that the backup provision of the definition of electronic storage 
exists only to ensure that the government cannot make an end-run around the privacy-protecting 
ECS rules by attempting to access backup copies of unopened e-mails made by the ISP for its 
administrative purposes. ISPs regularly generate backup copies of their servers in the event of a 
server crash or other problem, and they often store these copies for the long term. . . . The statutory 
focus on backup copies in the SCA was likely inspired by the 1985 Office of Technology 
Assessment report that had helped inspire the passage of the SCA. The report highlighted the 
special privacy threats raised by backup copies, which the report referred to as copies ‘[r]etained 
by the [e]lectronic [m]ail [c]ompany for [a]dministrative [p]urposes.’” (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Kerr, supra note 26, at 1217 n.61)). 
 115. See Kerr, supra note 25; see also Kerr, supra note 26, at 1218 (noting the ambiguous 
standard of “whether the user or employees of the service provider have reason to believe that 
they may need to access an additional copy of the file in the future”). 
 116. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075. Arguably, this is the traditional or original form of email, 
which still is common with employers seeking enhanced security for electronic communication. 
15
Palanica: "You've Got [Open] [E]mail"—The Unknown Email Privacy Issue and t
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
676 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
on the provider’s server. Despite the prioritization of user intent, Theofel 
maintained that in scenarios in which a “remote computing service” was 
the only repository of a user’s emails, the emails would not be considered 
backups.117 Web-based email inboxes have traditionally been considered 
“remote computing services” in their capacity of holding opened emails 
on their servers and therefore have not been protected under the SCA in 
the same fashion.118 
In relying on Theofel’s logic, other cases have produced results in 
which web-based email users, which constituted the highest percentage 
of email users by far in 2020, were not protected under the statute. For 
example, in United States v. Weaver,119 the district court held as follows: 
Users of web-based email systems, such as Hotmail, default 
to saving their messages only on the remote system. A 
Hotmail user can opt to connect an email program, such as 
Microsoft Outlook, to his or her Hotmail account and 
through it download messages onto a personal computer, but 
that is not the default method of using Hotmail. Thus, unless 
a Hotmail user varies from default use, the remote 
computing service is the only place he or she stores 
messages, and Microsoft is not storing that user’s opened 
messages for backup purposes.  
. . . . 
Previously opened emails stored by Microsoft for 
Hotmail users are not in electronic storage . . . .120 
Such unequal results under Theofel’s logic motivated Chief Justice Toal’s 
concurrence in Jennings.121 
While Theofel solidified a competing minority view among some 
district courts of the SCA’s definition of electronic storage and prized the 
importance of user intent in backing up emails,122 the Eighth Circuit, in 
Anzaldua, acknowledged the idea of user intent but restricted the scope 
of backup protection.123 The circumstances behind Anzaldua are also 
indicative of continued issues with the unauthorized access of email by 
private parties rather than government interference. In Anzaldua, a 
paramedic (Anzaldua) worked for the local fire district and received a 
 
 117. Id. at 1076–77. 
 118. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1216. 
 119. 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009).  
 120. Id. at 772–73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
 121. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 246–47 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 122. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76. 
 123. See Kerr, supra note 25. 
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reprimand from the fire chief for neglect of property.124 After a further 
incident involving inflammatory correspondence, which resulted in his 
temporary suspension,125 Anzaldua sent an email to a reporter for a large 
regional newspaper, which discussed alleged safety concerns and 
misappropriation of department funds.126 Anzaldua specifically requested 
to remain anonymous.127 Despite this attempt at a whistleblower 
complaint, a copy of the email was mysteriously forwarded from 
Anzaldua’s own Gmail account to the fire chief.128 As a result, Anzaldua 
was terminated from his position at the fire district.129  
In bringing his lawsuit to the district court, Anzaldua claimed, inter 
alia, that his ex-girlfriend and the fire chief had accessed his Gmail 
account to forward his whistleblower email to the fire district.130 In 
support of his theory, Anzaldua indicated that he had traced the account 
activity to an IP address at or near a restaurant the fire chief owned and 
where Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend worked.131 Similar to the Hately case 
discussed below,132 Anzaldua had provided his ex-girlfriend with his 
Gmail password for a limited purpose—in this case, to only send resumes 
to potential employers—but their romantic relationship had ended over a 
year prior.133 Although the SCA complaint contained other errors, the 
district court saw a leave to amend the complaint as futile because 
Anzaldua had provided his ex-girlfriend with access to his account.134 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that Anzaldua had sufficiently 
pleaded the unauthorized access claim135 but affirmed the denial to amend 
 
 124. Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 125. Id. at 827–28. After the incident regarding neglect of equipment, Anzaldua alleged that 
he drafted an email to a university professor on his personal computer but never sent it. Id. at 827. 
Despite this testimony, the email was sent from his Gmail account to the professor and made it 
back into the hands of the fire district chief. Id. While Anzaldua included this email to support his 
SCA claims, it seemed clear (and the court agreed) that a draft email was not included in the SCA 
because it had not yet been transmitted. Id. at 827, 840. 
 126. Id. at 828–29. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 829. 
 129. Id. at 830.  
 130. Id. at 831, 837–38. 
 131. Id. at 838. Specifically, Anzaldua alleged the forwarding of the whistleblower email 
from Anzaldua’s “sent” box and subsequent deletion of this activity occurred at or near the fire 
chief’s restaurant. Id. 
 132. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 774 (4th Cir. 2019). Given that Hately and his girlfriend 
had separated, it was presumed that she no longer had permission to utilize Hately’s email 
account. See id. 
 133. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 838. 
 134. Id. (noting that the complaint was already deficient because it did not appropriately state 
an SCA claim). 
 135. Id. It seemed apparent to the Eighth Circuit that, taking Anzaldua’s story as true, the 
ex-girlfriend exceeded the scope of permission granted to her. Such a rationale would be 
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because the email would not have qualified as being in electronic storage 
“for purposes of backup protection.”136 Anzaldua relied on Theofel’s 
logic, stating that the whistleblower email left in his sent folder served as 
a backup in case he ever needed to download it again.137 Recognizing that 
Theofel had been controversial, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that even if it 
adopted Theofel’s user-friendly “lifespan of a backup” approach, the 
email would still not be considered an intended backup.138 While user 
intent is a flexible doctrine and can account for “passive inaction,”139 the 
Eighth Circuit was not as receptive to this idea as the Theofel court. 
Anzaldua claimed that the sent email remained on Gmail’s servers “as a 
matter of course,” which prompted the Eighth Circuit to reason that 
Anzaldua did not intend to use the copy as a backup.140 Rather, Theofel’s 
logic would only apply to protect an email stored on the reporter’s email 
system and not Anzaldua’s Gmail account.141 
Anzaldua’s argument proves intriguing if one subscribes to the 
concept that the “SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the 
privacy of stored Internet communications,”142 but the Eighth Circuit, in 
drawing its conclusions, also misconstrued Theofel’s reasoning. Much of 
Theofel’s logic prized the idea of user intent and the concept of a 
“lifespan” or “normal course” of a message (and its corresponding 
backups).143 Anzaldua quoted Theofel in stating that just because “a copy 
could serve as a backup does not mean it is stored for that purpose”; 
however, Anzaldua failed to mention further context.144 The examples 
Theofel used to identify copies “not in electronic storage” were ones that 
were in direct correspondence with the ISP’s staff or messages that a user 
had flagged for the ISP’s deletion.145 Both of these examples seem 
uncommon, however. Neither of these examples suggests that using 
email as normal, such as keeping emails in one’s inbox during 
correspondence, would inherently disqualify emails as being in storage. 
Further, the plaintiffs in Theofel left their opened emails on Netgate’s 
servers146 and presumably knew that their “inaction” would leave these 
 
consistent with Theofel’s reasoning regarding the common law tort of trespass—one can only use 
another’s land within the scope of permission. 
 136. Id. at 838–39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)).  
 137. Id. at 840 (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 138. Id. at 842. 
 139. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012) (noting Justice Hearn’s 
criticism of simply leaving an opened email in one’s inbox). 
 140. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1214. 
 143. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 144. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842 (emphasis added) (quoting Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076). 
 145. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076. 
 146. Id. at 1075–76. 
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emails in storage, making them available for future reference. Thus, it 
does not seem to follow that the Eighth Circuit did not allow Anzaldua to 
rely on the functionality of his email account—as the Ninth Circuit 
allowed the plaintiffs in Theofel to do—to keep his “sent” email in storage 
because he knew that “sent” emails remained in storage.147 While 
Theofel’s “normal course” and “lifespan” doctrines are not friendly 
toward permanent or automatic storage,148 it would hardly seem 
reasonable that Anzaldua’s recent email correspondence with a reporter 
could not be considered within the “lifespan” of a sent message retained 
as a backup given the short period of time that elapsed from him sending 
the message and awaiting a response from the reporter.149 
C.  Hately v. Watts—The Fourth Circuit’s Focus on Modern Email 
Services: Satisfying Common Sense 
Hately further reiterates the role of email in the daily lives and 
relationships of everyday people—in a way not too dissimilar to 
Jennings, but with the opposite result. Again, the background and facts 
of the case set a relevant stage. From August 2011 to February 2015, 
Hately and his girlfriend, Torrenzano, had an intimate relationship 
resulting in two children.150 During their relationship, they shared their 
log-in information for their email accounts, which were web-based email 
accounts provided through Blue Ridge (their community college) and 
hosted by Google.151 In March 2015, Torrenzano informed Hately that 
she was having another intimate relationship with her co-worker, Watts; 
Hately and Torrenzano separated.152 Hately’s email password remained 
unchanged.153 In an effort to help Watts with his still-ongoing divorce, 
Torrenzano alleged that Watts’s wife and Hately were having an affair.154 
Torrenzano provided Watts with Hately’s email password to locate 
emails that corroborated the alleged affair.155 Once Hately found out that 
Watts accessed his opened emails, Hately filed a lawsuit, accusing Watts 
of unlawfully accessing Hately’s emails under the SCA.156 
In analyzing Hately’s claim that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment for Watts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
 
 147. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842. 
 148. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076 (“An ISP that kept permanent copies of temporary 
messages could not fairly be described as ‘backing up’ those messages.”). 
 149. See Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842. 
 150. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 774 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 151. Id. at 773–74. 
 152. Id. at 774.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. While the case facts are not crystal clear on this issue, it seems possible that 
Torrenzano may have contrived Hately’s alleged affair. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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Circuit emphasized the congressional intent and legislative history 
behind the SCA.157 Making reference to the OTA’s 1985 Electronic 
Surveillance and Civil Liberties study, the Fourth Circuit noted that prior 
to the SCA’s enactment, the “legal protections for electronic mail [were] 
‘weak, ambiguous, or non-existent’” and further expressed that 
“electronic mail remain[ed] legally as well as technically vulnerable to 
unauthorized surveillance.”158 The Fourth Circuit further provided 
supplementary information from the Senate Report (and corresponding 
House Report) that this legal vulnerability (1) “discourage[d] potential 
customers from using innovative communications systems,” such as 
email, (2) “encourage[d] unauthorized users to obtain access to 
communications” without regard to consequences, and (3) “ero[ded] 
th[e] . . . right [to privacy].”159 By providing this background, the Fourth 
Circuit presented the SCA as a much-needed deterrent to those who might 
infringe on the privacy of another’s electronic data. 
Turning to whether Hately’s emails were protected under the SCA, 
the Fourth Circuit began by accepting the basic framework of Theofel. 
First, the court agreed with Theofel that the “‘prior access [was] 
irrelevant’ [as] to whether emails [were] in ‘storage.’”160 Because 
Hately’s emails were “reserved for future use” by being accessible on 
Blue Ridge’s servers, irrespective of being opened, the court considered 
these emails “in ‘storage’” per the SCA.161 Second, the court mirrored 
Theofel again by holding that § 2510 could be satisfied by either (A) or 
(B) because holding otherwise would render (B) superfluous.162  
In addressing the issue of Hately’s emails being in “electronic 
storage” by an “electronic communication service,” the Fourth Circuit 
pushed past Theofel’s framework. Specifically, the SCA distinguishes 
between “electronic communication services” and “remote computing 
services.” An electronic communication service allows users to send and 
receive electronic communications, whereas a remote computing service 
provides computer storage or processing services to the public.163 
Further, the SCA’s elevated protections only apply to electronic 
communication services.164 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that 
 
 157. Id. at 782. 
 158. Id. at 783 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (1986) (quoting OTA ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 44)). 
 159. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-641, at 5) (alteration in original); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 
at 19 (1986).  
 160. Hately, 917 F.3d at 786 (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2004)).  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 787. 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining “electronic communication service”); id. § 2711(2) 
(defining “remote computing service”). 
 164. See id. §§ 2701, 2703. 
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Hately’s email account only functioned as a remote computing service 
with respect to his opened emails, holding that email providers were by 
definition electronic communication services and could function 
simultaneously as both types of services.165  
With regard to “electronic storage” for purposes of “backup 
protection,” the Fourth Circuit discarded Theofel’s user intent argument 
and sought coverage for web-based email services. Hately’s opened 
emails were hosted by Google, a web-based provider, and such 
technology uses redundant systems in multiple locations around the 
world.166 Redundant systems generate numerous copies of emails on 
different servers to prevent the destruction of email and ensure 
accessibility.167 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a web-based provider 
used these copies to its own benefit and administrative ease, as well as 
for the protection of the user.168 In this same vein, while the court 
acknowledged and arguably expanded user intent to include permanent 
storage, the court focused on web-based email as a product and 
highlighted that: 
[T]he meaning of “backup protection” does not turn on 
whether a user subjectively chose not to delete the email 
after reading the message because the user wanted to keep 
the message for backup protection. That is because the 
purpose of the web-based email service in providing storage 
for the message—storage that is a feature of the product the 
web-based email service offers—is to afford the user a place 
to store messages the user does not want destroyed. The web-
based email service does not need to know why the user has 
elected not to delete [a] particular message. Rather, the web-
based email service recognizes that users who choose to use 
a web-based email platform desire storage for read and 
unread messages and therefore the web-based email service 
provides such storage to meet user demand.”169 
The Fourth Circuit also justified that web-based email technology 
conformed to the SCA’s legislative history in how one accessed email. 
The House Report stated that an electronic mail service, which held a 
message in storage until the addressee “requested” it, was subject to 
 
 165. Hately, 917 F.3d at 789 (“[B]ecause an entity can simultaneously function as an 
electronic communication service and a remote computing service, an entity’s status as a remote 
computing service in no way precludes a determination that the entity also was acting as an 
electronic communication service.”). 
 166. Id. at 791. 
 167. Id. at 791–92. 
 168. Id. at 793. 
 169. Id. 
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§ 2701.170 The court noted that Hately’s email service held copies of his 
messages in this capacity, Hately could “request” them as many times as 
he wanted online, and nothing in the House report indicated that § 2701’s 
protections were limited to the first time a message was “request[ed].”171 
As a result, the court held that Hately’s opened emails stored by a web-
based email were in electronic storage and protected under the SCA.172 
While the Fourth Circuit’s decision to fill the gap and protect the 
status of opened web-based emails was appreciated, practical, and 
needed, its reasoning was at times a stretch; the court reasoned that 
certain enumerated statements in the SCA and its legislative history did 
not expressly exclude other alternatives. The questionable nature of this 
reasoning can be seen in the court’s allowance for remote computing 
services to overlap with electronic communication services, thereby 
extending the protections afforded to the electronic communication 
services under the SCA.173 The lower court’s interpretation that an email 
provider could only be acting as one type of service or the other, 
depending on the status of the email, also seemed plausible because they 
were separately enumerated. Despite bending specific SCA provisions, 
the Hately court seemed to run true to Congress’s overarching intent, 
specifically to “fill in a ‘gap’ in the then-existing law as to ‘the protect[ion 
of] the privacy and security of communications transmitted by . . . new 
forms of telecommunications and computer technology,’ including 
email.”174 Web-based email platforms, such as Gmail, seem to fall in 
these “gaps” in the twenty-first century, just as the protections for email 
in general were “weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent” compared to first-
class mail in the 1980s.175 Much like Chief Justice Toal’s opinion in 
Jennings criticized Theofel’s conceptions of user intent and differing 
email technologies as producing absurd results,176 the Fourth Circuit’s 
rationale also sought to avoid “arbitrary and untenable ‘gap[s]’ in the 
legal protection of electronic communications.”177 Indeed, the Fourth 
 
 170. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 63 (1986). 
 171. Hately, 917 F.3d at 794. 
 172. Id. at 794–98. 
 173. Id. at 788 (“But nothing in the plain language of the definitions of electronic 
communication service and remote computing service precludes an entity from simultaneously 
functioning as both.”). 
 174. Id. at 797 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986)). 
 175. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 45. 
 176. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d. 242, 246–47 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)). 
 177. Hately, 917 F.3d at 798 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5) (“It defies logic that the 
unopened junk and spam email messages that a user leaves in his or her inbox or designated folder 
without opening would be entitled to more protection than those messages the user chooses to 
open and retain. We do not believe Congress intended such an absurd result when it enacted a 
statute intended to fill in the gaps in the then-existing privacy protections for electronic 
communications and therefore spur adoption of new communication technologies, like email.”). 
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Circuit did so rather successfully by bringing opened emails on web-
based email servers into the fold.  
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the importance of the SCA cannot be understated. Providing 
both civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized access to electronic 
communications services,178 among other protections that restrict an 
ISP’s disclosure of information to the government or other parties,179 the 
SCA serves as an important deterrent in maintaining a civil society. Just 
as first-class mail is protected from unauthorized access while in transit 
or storage, so should electronic mail be protected from unauthorized 
access—whether the email is opened or not. 
However, considering protections were unclear for electronic mail in 
the 1980s prior to the enactment of the SCA, “[i]t is not always easy to 
square the decades-old SCA with the current state of email 
technology.”180 Much about email use and technology has changed (and 
continues to change) since 1986, but the protection of emails should not 
depend on whether one uses a desktop-based email provider or web-based 
provider. Further, emails should be protected from unauthorized access 
whether they are unopened or opened. Unlike first-class mail, which 
requires physical storage space, email services provide an easy and 
compact way to store correspondence in a virtually unlimited capacity—
and the privacy of these documents should not be absolved in an arbitrary 
manner. 
Ensuring comprehensive email protections under the existing SCA 
has proved tedious. By maintaining a strict textual reading of the SCA 
and resisting the urge to legislate from the bench, a plurality of the 
Jennings court declined to expand coverage of opened emails yet 
acknowledged gaps in protection existed.181 While the Theofel and 
Anzaldua courts sought to expand protection by emphasizing user intent, 
their interpretations were also flawed in that user intent could be difficult 
to prove regarding a user’s inaction and the protection differed in result 
based on email technology. Only as recently as 2019 did the Hately court 
succeed in expanding coverage to opened emails irrespective of whether 
one uses a desktop or web-based email service, but it did so only by 
skillfully maneuvering around statutory language and construing nearly 
thirty-five-year-old legislative intent in its favor. 
 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (criminal penalties); id. § 2707 (civil penalties).  
 179. Id. §§ 2702–2703. 
 180. Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 839 n.5 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 181. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The SCA is 
ill-fitted to address many modern-day issues, but it is this Court’s duty to interpret, not legislate.”); 
id. at 245 (“We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome’s actions give rise 
to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior.”).  
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Comprehensive email protection remains irregular outside of the 
Fourth Circuit. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Theofel 
in 2004 and in Jennings in 2013, the recent decision in Hately brings hope 
that other circuits and the Supreme Court will adopt the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the SCA to expand protection to all opened and 
unopened emails, regardless of email technology—or that Congress will 
revise the SCA accordingly. 
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